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Moral Rights, Human Rights, and Social Recognition 
 
Peter Jones 
  
 
Abstract: This article examines the thesis that rights are always and only 
conventional rights.  It identifies two versions of the conventionalist thesis by 
distinguishing how each understands a moral right. On one view, a moral right 
describes a conventional right that ought to exist, irrespective of whether it 
actually exists; on the other view, a moral right describes an actually existing 
conventional right that is morally justified.  The article criticises both versions 
of the conventionalist understanding of moral rights and human rights. It also 
distinguishes the kind of social recognition that contemporary conventionalists 
insist is a prerequisite for a right from that proposed by T.H. Green.  The 
article concludes with a defence of the orthodox understanding of moral rights 
and human rights as rights that are moral in foundation and that can be 
conceived as rights independently of conventional rights. 
 
 
The language of rights has a well-established place in our moral vocabulary.  There is 
nothing forced or unusual in saying, for example, that we have a moral right to be 
repaid a debt or a moral right to express our political or religious beliefs.  When we 
speak of a ‘moral right’ in this way, we most commonly imply that the right is moral 
in foundation.  If we were asked to justify our claim of right, we would do so by citing 
the moral reasons that, we believe, vindicate the claim.  A right is an entitlement and, 
just as legal entitlements have their foundation in law, so moral entitlements have 
their foundation in morality. 
 
Nowadays, ‘human rights’ can describe legal rights, since human rights figure both in 
international law and in the domestic law of many societies. Nevertheless, human 
rights are still widely conceived as moral rights – as rights that we have moral reason 
to ascribe to all human persons.  That is why we can speak of the violation of people’s 
human rights, even if those rights remain unrecognised by international or domestic 
law.  To that extent, contemporary thinking on human rights remains connected to 
earlier thinking on natural rights. 
 
Conventionalism 
 
In this article I examine a way of conceiving rights that rejects the notion that rights 
can be ‘moral’ in the way I have just described.  It does not claim that there is no 
legitimate sense in which rights can be described as ‘moral’, but it rejects the view 
that rights can be rights in virtue of morality alone and without reference to 
convention.  I shall describe this way of conceiving rights as ‘conventionalism’, since 
it holds that rights are always and only conventional rights.   
 
Within conventionalism, rights are conceived first and foremost as legal rights, but 
conventional rights can take other forms.  They may be conferred by the rules of non-
state institutions, such as universities or trade unions or churches.  People can also 
have rights arising from their society’s positive morality, that is, from the mores that 
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are actually shared by the members of a society and that are upheld by the sanction of 
social disapproval.   
 
Another way of describing the conventionalist position is through the language of 
social recognition and social practice.  In the full-blooded version of conventionalism, 
people have rights only in so far as they are recognised as possessing rights by the 
society to which they belong or in which they reside.  Rights are recognised primarily 
through being incorporated in a society’s law, but they may also be recognised in a 
society’s conventional morality.  Accordingly, rights are always social practices; in 
the absence of the relevant social practice, we can argue that a right ought to exist, but 
the right will not exist unless and until it exists as a social practice. 
 
In examining this view, I begin by distinguishing two forms of conventionalism.  
While these two forms are sometimes elided, they are significantly different.  Only 
the second presents a fully conventionalist understanding of rights and it is upon that 
understanding that I focus in the remainder of the article.  Having set out its main 
features, I comment critically on its conceptions of legal rights and human rights, 
before going on to mount a defence of the orthodox conception of moral rights – 
rights conceived as morally grounded entitlements.  However, before turning to that 
defence, I pause to consider T.H. Green’s well-known recognition theory of rights and 
suggest that his thinking on rights differs significantly from that of the contemporary 
conventionalists I criticise. 
 
Two forms of conventionalism are extant in current work on rights and their 
difference is best articulated with reference to how each understands the term ‘moral 
right’. 
 
Conventionalism (i): Sumner and Campbell 
 
The first form of conventionalism is exemplified by the work of Wayne Sumner 
(1987) and Tom Campbell (1983, pp.18-26; 1996, pp.164-72; 2006, pp.27-30).  They 
propose that we should understand a ‘moral right’ as a conventional right that people 
ought to have.  If we say, for example, that people have a moral right not to be 
tortured, that should mean that they ought to have a conventional right not to be 
tortured.  As a matter of fact, they may or may not have that conventional right but, 
whether or not they actually have it, we can still affirm their moral right not to be 
tortured because, through that affirmation, we present the right not to be tortured as a 
conventional right that they ought to have.  Similarly we should understand a human 
right to be a conventional right that everyone ought to have. 
 
Thus Sumner holds that ‘I have a moral right just in case my possession of the 
corresponding conventional right is morally justified’ (1987, p.137).  His phrasing 
here might suggest that I can have a moral right only if I already possess the 
corresponding conventional right, but he makes clear that the relevant test for a moral 
right is whether the corresponding conventional right can be morally justified, 
irrespective of whether it actually exists as a conventional right (1987, pp.136-51).  
Because we should only ever think of moral rights as morally justified conventional 
rights, ‘the concept of a moral right analytically presupposes, and is therefore 
logically parasitic on, that of a conventional right’ (1987, p.141).  But we can still use 
the term ‘moral right’ to describe conventional rights that ought to but do not exist, as 
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well as those that ought to and do exist.
1
  Campbell holds similarly that, ‘To claim 
that something is a moral right (if it is not a statement about existing societal rights) 
can be understood as a claim that certain social or legal norms ought to exist. … such 
rights can be seen as prescriptive affirmations about what rights there ought to be’ 
(2006, pp.28-9).
2
 
 
Both Sumner and Campbell would therefore allow us to say we have moral rights 
even when we do not actually possess the corresponding conventional rights and, to 
that extent, their stance on rights is not fully conventionalist.  On the other hand, they 
do not think of a moral right as a right that can stand independently of a conventional 
right, such that it can, qua right, justify the conventional right.  The expression ‘moral 
right’ is simply a way of speaking of conventional rights that are morally justifiable 
and which ought therefore to exist. 
 
The Sumner/Campbell account is prey to two objections.  First, insofar as it aims to 
capture what we normally mean when we say either that a person has a moral right to 
x, or that morally a person has a right to x, it fails.  If I say someone has a moral right 
not to be tortured, I normally mean to say that others are duty-bound not to torture 
him and that, if they do torture him, they violate a right that he has and not merely a 
conventional right that he ought to, but may not, have.  If the unfortunate victim has 
no conventional right not to be tortured and I protest that he has a moral right not to 
be tortured, I would mean to say not merely that the torturer’s act, while it does not 
currently violate a conventional right, would violate a conventional right if the legal 
system were as it should be.  I would mean to insist that, irrespective of the laws or 
conventions of the society in which the torturing takes place, the torturer violates a 
right of his victim.
3
 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, the usage proposed by Sumner and Campbell conflates the 
ideas of ‘rights we have’ and ‘rights we ought to have’.  The understanding of ‘moral 
rights’ they propose is similar to that captured by the phrase ‘ideal rights’.  D. G. 
Ritchie famously proposed that when people assert moral rights, and especially 
natural rights, they simply assert rights that they believe people would ideally possess. 
 
Natural rights, when alleged by the would-be reformer, mean those rights 
which in his opinion would be recognised by the public opinion of such a 
society as he admires, and would either be supported or at least would not be 
interfered with by its laws, if it had any laws; they are the rights which he 
thinks ought to be recognised, i.e. they are the rights sanctioned by his ideal 
society, whatever that may be. (1903, p.80; see also pp.75-6, 80-1, 85-7, 101-
3) 
 
Even Bentham, despite his general hostility to the idea of natural rights, flirted with 
the possibility of rendering the term ‘natural right’ acceptable by understanding it 
along the lines proposed by Ritchie.
4
  But describing rights as ‘ideal’ is really a way 
of describing them as ‘not real’.  If we think moral rights or ideal rights are not rights 
that people really have, but only conventional rights they ought to have, we would do 
better to avoid those terms altogether.  After all, what underlies the view we are 
considering here is the Benthamite tradition of hostility to attempts to pass off 
allegedly ‘natural’ and other sorts of ‘wished for’ right as if they were real rights, in 
the way that legal rights are really rights.  Continuing to ascribe ‘moral rights’ or 
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‘ideal rights’ to people, in the sense proposed by Sumner and Campbell, helps to 
maintain the confusion against which that tradition protests.
5
  There would be point in 
retaining ‘moral right’ if ‘ought to have a conventional right’ could be translated as 
‘has a moral right to a conventional right’.  But that is a translation neither Sumner 
nor Campbell can allow since it reintroduces a conception of moral rights that stands 
on its own two feet and that is precisely the conception they mean to resist.   
 
Conventionalism (ii): Darby and Martin 
 
If we reject the idea that moral rights can be rights simply in virtue of their being 
grounded in moral principles or moral reasons, we would do better to reject altogether 
the notion that there can be moral rights that are not also conventional rights.  That is 
the position adopted by Derrick Darby (2001, 2003a, 2003b) and Rex Martin (1993).  
They too retain the term ‘moral right’ but their understanding of its proper meaning 
places them in a different camp from Sumner and Campbell.  For Darby and Martin, 
conventional rights are the only rights there are, and a moral right is simply a morally 
justified conventional right.  While Sumner and Campbell would allow us to speak of 
a moral right to x even in the absence of a conventional right to x, Darby and Martin 
would not.  On their view, if there is no conventional right to x, there can be no moral 
right to x, simply because there is no right to x that we might describe as moral (or 
immoral).  We can, of course, still put forward well-grounded moral claims about the 
rights that people ought to have, but people should not be said to have those rights 
unless they have them as conventional rights.  So on this understanding, the ‘moral’ in 
‘moral right’ describes the ethical quality of a conventional right and contrasts with 
‘immoral’ or ‘amoral’ or ‘non-moral’.  It does not describe the type of foundation in 
virtue of which the right is a right, such that it contrasts with ‘legal’ or ‘conventional’; 
nor should it be used to describe a right that ought to, but does not, exist.
6
 
 
On this view, then, putative rights are really rights only if they are socially 
recognised; ‘it is the fact of social recognition that is the essential rights-making 
feature’ (Martin, 1993, p.53). ‘All rights including moral ones are products of social 
recognition’ (Darby, 2009, p.1).  Darby describes this position as ‘rights externalism’ 
since it holds that people have rights in virtue of the recognition bestowed upon them 
by others and not because they themselves possess certain ‘internal’ right-endowing 
properties (2001, 2004).  He also describes its view of moral rights as ‘moral rights 
positivism’, since it conceives the existence of a right, including a moral right, as a 
matter of social fact (2003b). The adjective ‘moral’ has a critical rather than a positive 
meaning, but the existence or non-existence of the right remains a matter of social fact 
and one on which the moral quality of the right has no bearing, just as for a legal 
positivist the moral quality of a law has no bearing on its existence or non-existence 
as law. 
 
Clearly, what drives Darby’s and Martin’s view is the thought that people can be said 
to have rights only in so far as they are actually able to enjoy and exercise them.  
Likewise, people are rights-holders and can function as rights-holders only if that is a 
status that their society actually accords them.  If, for example, we say that someone 
has a right to a fair trial in circumstances in which they are tried manifestly unfairly 
and there is nowhere and no one to whom they can turn to secure a fair trial, we risk 
mocking the notion of having a right.  In these circumstances, people do not have a 
right to a fair trial, and its being a right that they ought to have does not alter that fact. 
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A conspicuous feature of Darby’s and Martin’s account of rights, including legal 
rights, is their insistence that maintenance and enforcement matter as much to a 
right’s being a right as does formal recognition (Darby 2003a, pp.64-7; 2003b, pp.2-5; 
2009, pp.86-8; Martin 1993, pp.58-60, 64-72, 82-7; 2003).  A right that exists in a 
society’s statute books or which has a foundation in its customary law but which the 
society does nothing to maintain and secure, such that people cannot actually enjoy it, 
is not really a right at all.  At best it is a nominal right.  For Darby and Martin a right 
is a form of ‘social practice’: what matters are not mere legal formalities but whether 
that practice is actually present and operative in a society. Rights ‘are always actual 
practices based on social recognition and social support’ (Martin 1993, p.53).  That is 
why they treat legal rights as the paradigm case of rights.  They allow that people may 
have rights in virtue of the non-legal social mores of a society that are upheld by the 
sanction of social opinion (Martin 1993, pp.24-9, 86, 96; Darby 2009, pp.85-86).  But 
rights that rely upon social opinion for their existence will often be fragile or 
uncertain.  Legal rights, by contrast, are normally upheld by a society’s judicial 
system and enforced by the use of sanctions, which is why they are normally the 
clearest and most complete instance of rights.  It is also why Darby holds that the 
rights that people ought morally to enjoy they should usually enjoy as legal rights: if 
rights are morally justified, they should be fully secured to those who should possess 
them and that is best achieved by making them legal rights (2001, p.405; cf. Martin 
1993, pp.86-7). 
 
What then, on this view, are we to make of the idea of human rights?  If human rights 
are to qualify as genuine rights, they must meet the same criteria of recognition, 
maintenance and enforcement as other rights (Martin 1993, pp.73-97, 2003; Darby 
2003c).  They too must constitute established practices that are recognised by the 
society in which they are enjoyed and that are protected and promoted by that society 
so that they constitute genuinely operative practices.  Without recognition, 
maintenance and enforcement, we can have human rights claims – claims that there 
ought to be human rights – but no actual human rights.  Martin accepts that human 
rights are targeted mainly at governments but, rather than providing us with reason to 
ground human rights independently of governments, he sees that feature of human 
rights as providing additional reason for treating government recognition and 
promotion as necessary conditions for there being human rights.  Human rights are 
distinguished from other rights by their being rights to which all persons have morally 
valid claims and therefore rights which ought to be secured universally.  But, for any 
particular individual, human rights claims constitute claims to be provided with those 
rights by the government or political system of their particular society.  To that extent, 
human rights are ‘special’ rather than ‘general’ rights; a person possesses them as a 
member of a particular society, rather than as a member of the human race.  That is 
why Martin holds that all human rights are really civil rights, albeit civil rights 
distinguished by a certain kind of moral justification. 
 
Conventionalism, legal rights and enforcement 
 
While Darby and Martin challenge the orthodox conception of moral rights, they may 
seem to stay within the mainstream in their account of legal rights.  Yet even their 
understanding of legal rights demands more than the notion of a legal right is often 
thought to require.  On their understanding, a right is not something that ought to be 
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maintained and enforced; rather maintenance and enforcement are constitutive of a 
right such that, without them, there is no right.
7
  Yet, ordinarily, we would conceive a 
legal right separately from its maintenance and enforcement, such that the right was 
something that might or might not be maintained and enforced, rather than something 
that maintenance and enforcement brought into being.  Similarly, we might present 
the fact that a right is a legal right as a justification for its maintenance and 
enforcement and, if our government failed to uphold our rights, we might still insist 
that it was our rights that it failed to uphold.  But, on the Darby/Martin view, that 
would not be possible, because maintenance and enforcement are practices that 
contribute to the possession of a right, rather than practices that should follow upon its 
possession.   
 
That indicates that their ‘social practice’ conception of rights entails more than just a 
rejection of the traditional notion of moral rights.  It entails a more general rejection 
of rights conceived as titles or entitlements.  A legal right is not a legal title, which, as 
a title, might justify its maintenance and enforcement.  At best, a legal title will be a 
token of official recognition and will contribute to the existence of a legal right only 
as part of a larger and more inclusive social practice.  While we normally think of 
rights as providing reasons, it is hard to see how they can if we adopt the 
Darby/Martin view.  On their view, there may be reasons for rights, but it is difficult 
to see how rights themselves, conceived as social practices and therefore as states of 
affairs, can be reasons for anything.
8
 
 
J.S. Mill, unlike Darby and Martin, did embrace the idea of purely moral rights.  But 
like them, he made enforcement, or something akin to it, part of the concept of what it 
was to have a right: ‘When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a 
valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, 
or by that of education or opinion’ (1910, p.149; my emphasis).  The maintenance and 
enforcement that is relevant to Mill’s conception of a moral right is that which there 
ought to be rather than that which exists.  Nevertheless, he runs into the same sort of 
objection as do Darby and Martin.  It is not what ought to be maintained and enforced 
that defines the rights we ought to have; it is the rights that we ought to have that 
indicate and explain what (normally and in part) ought to be maintained and 
enforced.
9
  
 
Conventionalism and human rights 
 
The criticism to which the conventionalist understanding of human rights is most 
obviously subject is that it is at odds with the primary purpose of those rights.  That 
purpose is to set limits to how people may and may not be treated by those who wield 
political power.  If rights are to be adequate for that purpose, they cannot be ordinary 
legal rights since governments can grant, withhold or withdraw legal rights as they 
choose.  They need to be rights that, in conception are grounded independently of 
governments.  That is part of the point of describing them as ‘human’ and also why, in 
previous ages, people like Locke identified some rights as ‘natural’.  If human rights 
are no more than the creations of governments, they cannot perform the role they are 
designed to perform.  As Martin himself phrases this criticism, his view ‘makes the 
human rights people can have wholly dependent on what government chooses to 
provide’ (1993, p.96). 
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Martin gives two reasons why he believes this criticism to be ‘wide of the mark’ 
(1993, p.96).  First, we can still say that governments are under a moral duty to meet 
morally justified human rights claims, understood as claims to be given human rights.  
Secondly, the rights we think of as human rights may be recognised as rights in a 
society’s conventional morality even if they remain unrecognised in its law.  
However, neither of these points concedes much to ordinary human rights thinking. 
Even if a government owes moral duties to its citizens those moral duties do not, for 
Martin, answer to human rights.  Whether human rights are recognised in a society’s 
conventional morality is an entirely contingent matter and, if possession of those 
rights is dependent upon that recognition, ‘human rights’ will do little for individuals 
and minorities who are threatened by hostile governments or majorities.  It is difficult 
to see how Martin’s view could enable us to say that the Holocaust or the Rwandan 
genocide violated human rights, even though such genocidal episodes are typically 
regarded of as extreme violations of human rights.
10
 
 
We might expect Martin to seek refuge from this criticism in the laws and institutions 
of the international world.  Internationally recognised human rights are conventional 
or ‘positive’ forms of right and so would seem legitimately described as ‘rights’ by a 
conventionalist.  But that way of rescuing the traditional role of human rights is not 
open to Martin, since he insists that maintenance and enforcement are constitutive of 
the practices we call ‘rights’ (1993, pp.59-60).  Thus, if a government successfully 
flouts the international community and denies its citizens the rights that the 
international community alleges to be human rights, those will be neither rights that 
its citizens have nor rights that their government violates.   
 
This feature of Martin’s position applies not just to human rights but to any form of 
morally grounded right that we might want to deploy for critical purposes.  It is just 
most vivid in the case of human rights because of the political role we expect those 
rights to perform.  In his work, Darby has sought to resist the claim that rejecting the 
notion that people can have rights in virtue of moral reasons alone will result in 
‘moral impoverishment’ (1999; 2009, pp.62-73).  That is not a case that the idea of 
social recognition can be used to make.  Whatever virtue there may be in making 
social recognition a necessary condition of rights-possession, social recognition 
cannot compensate for any moral deficit that results from eliminating rights from our 
moral thinking.  If rights can disappear from morality without moral loss, it must be 
because there are other moral concepts, or moral theories to which rights are not 
integral, that can do the job just as well.  Of course, we might take the view that the 
substantive claims associated with moral rights ought to be rubbished.  There is a 
strong tradition of hostility not just to the concepts of moral rights, natural rights and 
human rights, but also to the sorts of substantive claims rights have been used to 
make.  But, while Darby occasionally dallies with that substantive criticism (2003c, 
pp.210-11), he is mostly concerned not to reject the moral claims associated with the 
orthodox concepts of moral rights and human rights, but to deny that we need those 
concepts to make them. 
 
T. H. Green on Rights and Recognition 
 
Before attempting to defend the orthodox concepts of moral and human rights against 
Darby’s and Martin’s claims, I want to pause to consider T.H. Green’s celebrated 
social recognition thesis about rights.  While Jeremy Bentham is the historical 
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influence most frequently cited by those who are sceptical of orthodox notions of 
moral rights, T.H. Green is for Martin a much more significant influence (1993, 
p.353).  He describes Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation as 
‘perhaps the finest book in the philosophy of rights written to date’ (1986, p.104).  
Darby too finds sustenance in Green’s work (2009, pp.30-7, 142-69).  How then do 
Green’s claims about the relationship between rights and recognition compare with 
those of Darby and Martin?  I want to preface my answer with some observations on 
the idea of recognition itself. 
 
‘Recognition’ of the sort with which we are concerned here can come in two forms.11  
Sometimes it is a form of acknowledgement or acceptance.  In conformity with this 
sense, I may recognise that Mozart was a better composer than Haydn, or that Britain 
is no longer a world power, or that I have been fortunate, or that I have behaved 
badly.  Recognition can be negative; we may, for example, recognise someone as a 
failure or as untrustworthy.  More commonly, however, it is deployed positively and 
certainly, when people demand or crave recognition, it is positive endorsement that 
they seek.  In this more positive mode, we may recognise, for example, that Charles 
Dickens was a great novelist or that Usain Bolt is a great athlete.  Most societies have 
processes through which this sort of recognition is formally given; universities accord 
it through the award of honorary degrees, militaries through the award of medals, and 
so on.  This sort of recognition can also be straightforwardly factual.  I may recognise, 
for example, that (at the time of writing) Usain Bolt has run one hundred metres faster 
than anyone else. 
 
The feature of this sort of recognition to which I want to draw attention is that it does 
not understand itself to create what it recognises.  If, for example, we recognise 
Dickens as a great novelist, we do not think that Dickens becomes a great novelist 
through our recognition.  On the contrary, we think that Dickens’s achievement is 
independent of our recognition; we simply notice and duly acknowledge it.  Similarly, 
if an army recognises the bravery of a soldier by awarding her a medal, it does not 
understand itself to be making her brave through the award of a medal; rather the 
award provides formal and approving acknowledgement of her bravery.  This feature 
of recognition is even more readily evident when we recognise simple matters of fact, 
such as the speed of Usain Bolt’s running.12 
 
Sometimes, however, recognition takes more creative forms.  A group of individuals 
may recognise one of their number as their leader.  Here the act of recognition creates 
what it recognises: the leader becomes leader in virtue of his being recognised as such 
by the other members of the group.  A person might, through his activism and force of 
character, come to assume a leading role without anyone’s design and, at some point, 
the other members of the group may simply acknowledge what is already a matter of 
fact.   But normally, when we speak of a group’s recognising someone as their leader, 
we think of their recognition as an act of conferral; an individual is constituted leader 
through the group’s act of recognition.  Accordingly, if they withdraw their 
recognition, he ceases to be leader. 
 
When Darby and Martin speak of recognition in relation to rights, they must mean 
recognition as creation or conferral.  If legal recognition, or some other form of 
conventional recognition, of a right were to mean ‘acknowledgement’, that would 
imply that, in some form, the recognised right existed independently and in advance 
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of the recognition, and that implication is precisely what Darby and Martin mean to 
deny.  For them, a right must be a right in virtue of its being recognised by the laws or 
the other conventional rules of the relevant society.  The rules confer the right; they 
do not notice its pre-existence. 
 
In a well-known couple of sentences, Green declared, ‘rights are made by recognition.  
There is no right but “thinking makes it so”’ (1941, s.136).  That would seem to place 
him in the same camp as Darby and Martin, but Green’s position on rights and 
recognition is both different from and more complex than theirs.  I will comment on it 
here only cursorily, though not I hope in a way that misrepresents Green. 
 
Green distinguishes between state and society and his claim that rights entail 
recognition relates primarily to the members of a society rather than to the state.  The 
state has a role in the recognition of rights: it should enact and uphold a system of 
legal rights, but the rights that it institutionalises should be rights that are already 
recognised by the society it governs.   
 
… the state, or the sovereign as a characteristic institution of the state, does 
not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights already existing.  It secures 
and extends the exercise of powers, which men … had recognised in each 
other as being capable of direction to that common good, and had already in 
certain measure secured to each other in consequence of that recognition. 
(1941, s.132) 
 
Thus, while Green uses the language of sovereignty, he denies that a society’s 
members can have no rights but those granted by their sovereign or that they cannot 
have rights against the sovereign (1941, ss.137-47).  A state presupposes that those it 
governs have rights; a society constitutes itself as a state the better to maintain its 
members’ rights (1941, s.139). 
 
What then is this prior form of recognition that yields rights?  The members of a 
society each possess certain powers (i.e. capacities or capabilities) that they should 
exercise and should therefore be free to exercise.
13
  The freedom to exercise those 
powers should be secured for each member because their exercise is essential for the 
attainment of the ideal good that the members of a society share as their common 
good.  That common good consists in their mutual attainment of self-perfection.  It is 
their capacity to recognise and to be determined by that good that distinguishes 
individuals as moral persons, and only moral persons – only beings possessing a will 
– can possess ethical (as distinct from legal) rights.  It is the contribution of those 
rights to the realisation of their holder’s will that justifies their possession (1941, 
s.27). 
 
If moral personality and moral rights are linked in that way, why is recognition 
necessary for the possession of rights?  Green explains that, when he says that ‘rights 
are made by recognition’ and that there is no right ‘but thinking makes it so’, he 
means that rights exist ‘solely in consciousness’.  ‘Nothing is more real than a right, 
yet its existence is purely ideal’ (1941, s.136); it exists only in idea, only in the moral 
consciousness of those who recognise it.  If that were all he meant, virtually all 
proponents of moral rights could agree with him.  However, he clearly means more.  
Social recognition matters because that recognition secures the freedom of each to 
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realise his powers and it is that ‘securing’ that realises rights; ‘the free exercise of his 
powers is secured to each member [of a society] through the recognition by each of 
the others as entitled to the same freedom with himself’ (1941, s.25; see also ss.26, 
29-31, 114-17, 132, 138-9, 142).  While social recognition has a cognitive character, 
it entails more than just noticing and accepting something about the nature of others 
and ourselves.  It entails acting in consonance with what we notice and accept.  To 
recognise that persons have the powers that render them capable of possessing rights 
is to recognise that they ought to enjoy those rights and that recognition, in turn, 
spawns the mutually respectful attitudes and conduct amongst a society’s members 
that serves actually to secure rights for them.  The members of a society accord rights 
equally to one another as a necessary part of their recognising the rightfulness of that 
state of affairs.  It is in that more developed sense that their ‘thinking makes it so’. 
 
How does Green’s idea of social recognition map on to the two types of recognition 
that I distinguished above?  Does it acknowledge or does it create?  While it seems to 
do both, it works, in the first instance, through acknowledgement.  The members of a 
society come to acknowledge one another, albeit gradually and slowly, as beings 
possessed of moral powers that destine them to realise a common good and it is that 
acknowledgement that leads them to treat one another as possessors of rights.  They  
do not bring rights into existence in the manner of either a legislator or a social 
contractor.  Rather, they arrive at rights by recognising a series of moral truths.  They 
acknowledge what morally is the case and what morally they have no option but to 
acknowledge.  Indeed, it would seem that, in their own eyes, the recognisers must 
understand themselves to acknowledge rather than to create the rights that they 
recognise.  How else could they come to treat one another as rights-holders and, 
through that treatment, ‘secure’ rights for one another?  Of course, the ‘securing’ part 
of the process remains essential for Green; it is by securing certain freedoms for one 
another that the recognisers ‘confer’ rights upon one another. Nevertheless, the 
recognisers must think of one another as possessing rights (or, if we are to avoid that 
term, morally grounded entitlements) independently of their recognition, if their 
recognition is to secure the rights it recognises.  If they did not conceive one another 
as possessors of rights, why would they treat one another as possessors of rights?  
Thus, in the recognising process, the conferral of rights seems to depend upon a prior 
conception of people as right-holders.  Perhaps that is how, for Green, the ‘thinking’ 
of the recognisers makes it so.    
 
We might also ask what role morality plays, for Green, in constituting a right.  In 
Darby’s and Martin’s thinking, it plays none. Moral considerations may distinguish a 
right as morally justified, but they will contribute nothing to its being a right.  For 
Green, the answer is again less straightforward.  His socially recognised rights are like 
non-legal conventional rights to the extent that they must be embraced and respected 
by the society whose members possess them; they cannot be rights that an individual 
has but that no-one recognises.  On the other hand, for the recognisers, the rights they 
recognise are not merely conventional in that the moral considerations that drive the 
recognising process imply that they are necessarily moral rights – they are morally 
grounded entitlements which the members of a society ought to enjoy equally and 
which each is duty-bound to respect.  In the absence of those moral considerations, 
there would be nothing that the recognisers could recognise as rights.  Thus, for 
Green’s recognisers, the moral quality of a right is as essential to its having the status 
and character of a right as is anything that might equate with its conventionality.
14
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In defence of moral rights 
 
As I previously mentioned, the incorporation of rights in morality has frequently been 
attacked for substantive as well as conceptual reasons, especially when it has led to 
the assertion of natural or human rights.  Bentham rejected natural rights-thinking for 
its wrong-headed morality as well as for its erroneous conception of rights.  Raymond 
Geuss’s (2001) and Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1985) contemporary assaults on moral 
rights and human rights have a similarly comprehensive character.  More generally, 
misgivings about the egoism and atomism that rights-thinking allegedly promotes are 
widely entertained and frequently voiced.  That sort of substantive critique of rights-
thinking is not, however, at issue here.  On the contrary, a common part of the 
conventionalist case is that we can insist that rights can be only conventional without 
sacrificing any of the substantive moral claims that moral rights-theorists are so keen 
to make.
15
 
 
Can we, then, dispense with the idea of moral rights without moral loss?  By ‘moral 
rights’ here and in the remainder of this section, I shall mean rights that are rights in 
virtue of their moral character or foundation only; I do not mean rights that exist only 
as conventional rights but that also happen to be morally justified. 
 
What rights bring to morality is a subject-centred perspective such that, in Rawls’s 
phrase, we treat those who possess rights as a ‘self-authenticating sources of valid 
claims’ (1993, p.32).  That is captured in two related ways of thinking that go with 
rights.  The first is the concept of owing: there are certain sorts of conduct, certain 
sorts of doing or not doing, that we owe to others.  What makes that conduct morally 
rightful and morally required is that it is owed to the person who possesses the right.  
That does not mean that moral rights claims must be logically primitive, such that 
there is nothing to be said beyond insisting that there are some things we just ‘owe’ 
others.  A good deal of moral argument may need to go on before we reach a right 
but, having reached the right, the concept of owing explains how using the idea of a 
right makes a difference to our moral thinking. 
 
The second concept is that of wronging.  When we violate a right, we do not merely 
do wrong, we wrong someone.  Introducing the idea of rights means that ‘wrong’ 
ceases to be a noun or an adjective only; it can also function as a verb and as a 
transitive verb.  We have the idea of not merely acting wrongly or committing a 
wrong but the more specific idea of wronging someone.  Of course, wronging is really 
only the flip-side of owing, but considering it as an idea in its own right helps to bring 
out the moral thinking special to rights.   
 
These ideas also indicate the idea of moral status associated with rights-thinking.  We 
ascribe that status only to beings to which we think that we can owe certain forms of 
conduct and that we believe we would wrong if we failed to treat them accordingly.  
That, for example, provides the conceptual test for whether we should extend rights to 
more than just human persons. 
 
It is this central feature of rights that, I believe, lies behind the choice (or will) and 
interest (or benefit) ‘theories’ of rights, and the rivalry between them.  Each is trying 
to capture the idea of owing: in one case owing is signalled by the right-holder’s 
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having control over the performance of another’s duty, in the other it is indicated by 
the right-holder’s being the intended beneficiary of a duty.  Neither ‘theory’ does the 
job adequately, which explains the interminable wrangling over which theory is 
correct.
16
 
 
Now we could, of course, take the term ‘rights’ out of morality and replace it with a 
synonym.  While conventionalists reject the notion of moral rights (as I am using it 
here), they are quite happy to speak of ‘claims’ that are ‘morally valid’ or ‘morally 
justified’ and to accept that some if not all such claims should be instantiated as legal 
rights.  Proponents of moral rights, like Rawls (1993) and Feinberg (1970), often use 
the same terminology.  The trouble with these proposals is that we do not think that 
all ‘claims’, not even all ‘morally valid’ or ‘morally justified’ claims, amount to moral 
rights.  Something more is needed; hence the efforts of Dworkin, Nozick and Raz to 
characterise rights respectively as ‘trumps’, or ‘side-constraints’, or ‘exclusionary 
reasons’ (Dworkin 1978, pp.90-4, 364-8; 1985, pp.335-72; Nozick 1974, p.28-33; Raz 
1975 pp.35-48; 1986, pp.186-7, 195-6).
17
  But the more important objection to 
substituting another language for the language of rights is that it is singularly 
pointless.  ‘Entitlement’ is a better synonym for ‘right’ than ‘claim’, but what would 
we gain if we substituted it for ‘right’?  If conventionalists want to hold that rights can 
be removed from morality without loss, they have to show not merely that we can 
avoid the language of rights but that we can strip out of morality, without loss, the 
whole idea of rights and all that it entails. 
 
Circumlocutions, that aim to get to the same place as moral rights, but by way of 
reference to moral duties or moral obligations instead, are equally pointless.  For 
example, saying that people owe duties to others and that failure to perform those 
duties wrongs the people to whom they are owed, does not avoid rights; it simply 
talks about them in another way.  Not all duties answer to rights, but many do and it is 
rights that give them their point.  Again, we could no doubt give an explanation of 
why those moral duties were duties without making any express reference to ‘rights’, 
but the idea of rights would still be present in, or implied by, our explanation.   
 
It is a curious feature of some who oppose the concept of a moral right that they have 
no equivalent misgivings about the concept of a moral duty.  That can make sense in 
so far as duties logically do not entail rights, but it is puzzling in so far as duties, as 
relational duties, are coupled with rights.  Some legal duties correlate with, or arise 
from, legal rights and the conventionalist can insist that, if they are to count as legal 
duties, they must meet the same criteria of recognition, maintenance and enforcement 
as legal rights.  But, in so far as a moral duty correlates with, or arises from, what we 
would normally describe as a ‘moral right’, what is it supposed to correlate with, or to 
arise from, that is other than a right?
18
  Martin’s answer is a ‘morally valid claim’, 
which, if it is no more than a morally valid claim, falls short of a right because it lacks 
the social recognition necessary for it to be a right (1993, pp.85-6, 92-7).  But why 
does the same logic not apply to duties?  Why should our thinking about what is ‘due 
from’ and what is ‘due to’ be so radically different?19  
 
So it seems to me that the idea of rights, as opposed merely to the language of rights, 
does contribute something distinctive to our moral thinking.  That distinctiveness 
explains why many of us continue to think of human rights as moral rights first and 
foremost.  There are certain things that it is morally wrong to do to, or to not do for, 
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any human person.  There are certain actions or inactions that are owed to anyone 
who is a human person and whom we wrong if he or she is not treated accordingly.  It 
is that conception that makes human rights such a potent idea when we seek to 
constrain political power.  It is a conception that is wholly at odds with the claim that 
human rights, properly so-called, can be granted only by governments.  I do not 
pretend that this conception must be present in every usage of ‘human right’, but it is 
very widely shared and its substance would be difficult, if not impossible, to capture 
without the idea of moral rights. 
 
None of this is to deny that social recognition matters.  If rights matter, their 
recognition must matter.  Nor is it to deny that rights grounded in law or custom can 
be sources of moral obligation.  For example, in the absence of legal title a person 
may have no other title to a good but, once the person has legal title to it, theft of the 
good can, ceteris paribus, wrong the title-holder morally as well as legally.  The same 
can hold if custom rather than law is the source of title.  Thus, while we commonly 
suppose that the moral should shape the legal and the customary, the legal and the 
customary can also shape the moral.  My purpose has been to deny only that moral 
rights must always be parasitic upon legal or customary norms. 
 
If we are to speak of moral rights, including moral human rights, we must not, of 
course, imply that people ‘have’ them in the same manner in which they ‘have’ 
conventional rights.  People’s having or not having conventional rights is a matter of 
fact.  Their having or not having moral rights is not.  Moreover, the moral rights they 
have will be controversial to the extent that the moral reasons that underlie them are 
controversial (cf. Frey, 1980, pp.14-17, 1983 pp.46-66; Nielsen 1968; Young 1978).  
But moral rights are controversial only because morality is controversial and that 
controversy provides no more reason to excise rights from our moral thinking than to 
excise other concepts such as duty, justice or virtue. 
 
The language of ‘existence’ is particularly unfortunate when used in relation to moral 
rights.  Sumner approaches the question of what should count as rights by 
investigating and setting out ‘existence’ conditions for rights (1987; cf. Geuss 2001, 
p.145; Martin 1993, p.74).  Unsurprisingly, both moral rights and natural rights (as 
these are ordinarily understood) perform poorly when tested against these existence 
conditions.  People often ask whether human rights ‘exist’, and proponents of human 
rights are frequently as keen to answer ‘yes’ as are opponents to answer ‘no’.  In fact, 
the question should be neither asked nor answered.  Insofar as we think of human 
rights as moral rights, the question is no more appropriate than asking whether the 
categorical imperative or the principle of utility ‘exists’?  None of these moral notions 
exists in any ordinary sense of ‘exist’, but that renders them neither unintelligible nor 
indefensible as moral ideas. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are obvious attractions in the conventionalist understanding of rights.  The most 
compelling in Darby’s and Martin’s thorough-going version, though not in Sumner’s 
and Campbell’s half-way house, is that it removes any ambiguity from claims that 
people ‘have’ rights: people will ‘have’ rights only if their rights are a reality, that is, 
only if people are able, as a matter of fact, to enjoy them.  That enables us to avoid 
confusion between the rights that people have and the rights that they ought to have, 
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which loose talk about moral rights or human rights sometimes promotes.  However, 
the conventionalist view is a revisionist view in that both moral rights and human 
rights (as these are ordinarily understood) have a long-established and well-
entrenched place in our moral vocabulary.  There seems little prospect that the 
conventionalists will succeed in dislodging them from that vocabulary. But, more to 
the point, we would lose something significant and distinctive in our moral thinking if 
their revisionist project were to be successful, and the loss would outweigh anything 
that we might gain – or so I have tried to argue. 
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British Idealism, organised by Maria Dimova-Cookson, University of Manchester, 
2009, and the conference on ‘Rights and Recognition’, organised by David Boucher, 
University of Cardiff, 2009.  I am particularly grateful, for their comments on earlier 
drafts of the paper, to David Boucher, Thom Brooks, Derrick Darby, Maria Dimova-
Cookson, Rex Martin, Colin Tyler, and Political Studies’ anonymous referees. 
 
1.  The following is Sumner’s final and fully inclusive definition of a moral right: ‘A 
moral right with a determinate scope and content is genuine just in case the policy of 
conferring a right with the same scope and content in some conventional rule system 
is strongly justified in the actual circumstances under which the system would 
operate.’ (1987, p.148)  He gives an equivalent account of moral duties: these ‘are not 
identical to conventional duties, but they are identical to those conventional duties 
whose existence is morally justified’ (1987, p.135).   
 
2.  Campbell (1983, p. 19; 2006, p. 28) therefore associates moral rights with what 
Feinberg (1970, pp. 254-5; 1973, p. 67) calls ‘manifesto rights’ – rights that are 
‘permanent possibilities of rights’, which people would ideally have but which no-one 
actually has a duty to honour (such as rights to material resources that generate no 
corresponding duties because of conditions of scarcity).  My own view is that the 
notion of ‘manifesto rights’ is singularly unfortunate, since it invites us to pretend that 
people have rights that they do not.  See further, Jones, 1994, p.164. 
 
3. For further criticism of the ‘ought to be a legal right’ understanding of ‘moral 
right’, see Dworkin 1978, pp.52-8, and Feinberg 1992, and, from a different stance, 
Darby 2009, pp.93-8.   
 
4.  ‘If I say a man has a natural right … all that it can mean, if it mean any thing and 
mean true, is, that I am of the opinion he ought to have a political right to it; that by 
appropriate services rendered upon occasion to him by the appropriate functionaries 
of government, he ought to be protected and secured in the use of it.’ (1962, III, 
p.218)  In general, however, Bentham makes no concession to natural rights or to any 
other sort of allegedly moral right (1962, II, pp.491-534, and III, pp.217-224).  Ritchie 
too thought a reformer was best advised to avoid the term ‘natural right’ (1903, 
p.270). 
 
5.  Frey (1980, pp.13-14) and Geuss (2001, pp.144-6) share the view that proclaiming 
moral or natural or human rights is really a way of talking about legal rights that 
people do not have but which the proclaimers think they ought to have, but both see 
that interpretation as debunking, not legitimating, notions of moral, natural and human 
rights. 
 
6. Martin (1993, p.125) does say that his approach can accommodate traditional 
natural rights theory, to the extent that it makes room for critical moral norms about 
what (conventional) rights there ought to be.   
 
7.  This position is shared by Geuss; he holds it ‘essential to the existence of a set of 
“rights” that there be some specifiable and more or less effective mechanism for 
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enforcing them’ (2001, p.143; see more generally pp.136-8, 143-52).   For an account 
of just how demanding ‘enforcement’ can be as a necessary condition of rights-
possession, see James, 2003. 
 
8.  When I say that rights provides reasons, I mean primarily that they provide reasons 
for others as they relate to the right-holder rather than for the right-holder himself, 
although having the right to do or to receive may also figure in the right-holder’s 
reasoning about what he should or should not do. 
 
9.  For critiques of  ‘sanctions’ theories of rights and the enforceability argument, see 
Jones 1994, pp.39-44, and Tasioulas 2007, pp.82-88. 
 
10.  In fairness to Martin, I should note that he does not seek to veto usage of the term 
‘human right’ to describe a justified claim, independently of whether that claim is 
socially recognised.  But he still presents a carefully articulated case for preferring a 
usage that includes social recognition in the preconditions for there being a human 
right, even though he is more relaxed about usage of cognate terms such as ‘human 
rights norms’ (2003, pp.179-90). 
 
11. I present and defend this analysis of forms of recognition at greater length in Jones 
2006a and 2006b. 
 
12.  It is, of course, true that the concepts of literary greatness or athletic prowess are 
humanly created rather than discovered.  But, once we have those concepts in place, 
whether a particular individual fits them, is a matter of discovery rather than 
invention.  It is in that sense that we understand ourselves to ‘acknowledge’ Dickens 
as a great author and Bolt as a great athlete; we do not think of ourselves as creating 
the greatness that we attribute to them. 
 
13.  Green generally uses the term ‘powers’ as I use it here, but occasionally as a 
synonym for rights themselves; e.g. 1941, s.103. 
 
14.  For analyses and discussions of Green’s thought on rights, see Dimova-Cookson, 
2001; Gaus, 2006; Simhony, 2006; Thomas 1987; Tyler 1997, 2010.   
 
15.  See, in addition to the other authors I have discussed, Frey, 1980, pp.4-17; 1983, 
pp.43-51, and Young 1978, both of whom argue that, if moral rights derive from 
moral principles, those principles will suffice; adding moral rights is a superfluous. 
 
16. For a similar view, see Cruft 2004.   
 
17. In the same spirit, Sumner distinguishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of 
moral justification and argues that we have moral rights only when the corresponding 
conventional rights are strongly justified (1987, pp.144-7).   
 
18.  As indicated in note 1 above, Sumner’s analysis of rights and duties does 
maintain a symmetry between them, but he does not make maintenance and 
enforcement defining features of either rights or duties.   
 
 18 
19. For T.H. Green, by contrast, recognition is a prerequisite for much more than 
rights: ‘… only through a recognition by certain men of a common interest, and 
through the expression of that recognition in certain regulations of their dealings with 
each other, could morality originate, or any meaning be gained for such terms as 
“ought” and “right” and their equivalents’ (1941, s.116).  For a contemporary 
statement of recognition theory that is closer in character to Green’s and that 
encompasses more than rights, see Boucher 2011. 
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